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This paper provides comprehensive, detailed documentation of major corporate governance reforms 
(CGRs) undertaken by 26 advanced and emerging economies. Have these reforms impacted 
corporate investment decisions by altering investor protection (IP)? To answer this question, we 
estimate the CGRs’ impacts on foreign acquirers’ tendency to pick better performing firms in 
emerging markets. We argue the cherry picking is partly due to emerging countries’ weaker IP than 
acquirer countries’, predicting a positive relation between the degree of cherry picking and the gap in 
the strength of IP. If the CGRs strengthen IP, the gap will decrease (increase) following a CGR in a 
target’s (acquirer’s) country, moderating (intensifying) the cherry picking tendency. This is what we 
find when we estimate difference-in-differences in cherry picking before and after a CGR. These 
results not only demonstrate the CGRs’ impacts, but also imply the IP gap between capital exporting 
and importing countries distorts firm-level allocation of foreign capital inflows and reduces the 
benefits of globalization.  
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Since the late 1990s a number of developed and emerging countries have undertaken 
corporate governance reforms (CGRs), defined here as deliberate interventions in a country’s 
corporate governance tradition by the state, security and exchange commission, or stock exchanges. 
This paper provides a comprehensive documentation of 26 CGRs undertaken worldwide over the 
period 1991-2007 using careful, painstakingly meticulous procedures. It details events leading up to 
each CGR, relevant dates, the scope of the reform, regulation contents, the level of enforcement, 
outcome and criticism, and other regulatory changes following the CGR. We make this database 
available on the Journal’s website, hoping to encourage and provide useful resources to study 
comparative corporate governance.  A brief summary of the database is provided in the Appendix. 
The precise nature and strength of the CGRs vary across countries. However, they all share 
the common objective of strengthening investor protection (IP). Have the CGRs achieved their 
objective? If so, do they affect corporate investment decisions? To investigate these issues, we 
examine whether CGRs trigger a change in foreign acquirers’ tendency to target better performing 
firms when they make acquisitions in emerging markets. We examine changes in the cherry picking 
tendency because we conjecture that one of the possible causes is the gap in the strength of IP 
between the target and acquirer countries, predicting that when the IP gap decreases, cherry picking 
will moderate, but it will intensify when the gap increases. If CGRs strengthen IP, a CGR 
undertaken by a target country or an acquirer country will change the IP gap.  
Cherry picking by acquirers from developed economies is a well-documented phenomenon 
in the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature. Aitken and Harrison (1999) identify a positive 
relation between the likelihood of foreign equity acquisition of Venezuelan firms and the local firms’ 
pre-acquisition performance. 1 Subsequent studies document similar cherry picking tendencies in a 
                                                 
1 The cherry picking phenomenon became an important issue in the FDI literature after Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
identified a selection bias in FDI; namely, targets of FDI were already performing better before they were acquired. 
This selection bias implies much of the previously estimated positive impacts of foreign ownership can be attributed to 
cherry picking. Consequently, subsequent studies estimating the impact of foreign ownership on firm performance 
control for cherry picking in emerging countries. 
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number of Eastern European countries (e.g., Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Konings, 2001; Javorcik, 
2004; and Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2005).  The cherry picking phenomenon, however, 
seems to be a unique to emerging markets with weak IP. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012), for 
example, find no evidence foreign acquirers cherry pick targets in the U.K., a country with strong IP.  
Foreign acquirers may cherry pick because better performing firms tend to be better 
managed and allow for greater synergies. The difficulty of acquiring relevant local information about 
potential targets may also attract foreign acquirers to better performing targets.2 These explanations, 
though quite plausible, ignore the cost of acquisitions. Better performing firms are valued higher, 
making them more expensive to acquire. 
One factor affecting costs of acquisition is the strength of IP in the target country. Consider 
an acquirer from a strong IP country seeking a target in an emerging market with weak IP. Barclay 
and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) argue the reservation price of controlling 
equity stakes in a target includes control premiums priced at the value of private benefits consumed 
by controlling stockholders.3 Because the acquirer’s home country has stronger IP than the target 
country, imposing stricter constraints on diversion for private benefits, the acquirer values the 
control premium less than the target’s controlling shareholder.  
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) show that when firms have 
more profitable investment opportunities, their controlling shareholders consume fewer private 
benefits because diversion for private benefits could lead to foregoing profitable investments.4 Fewer 
                                                 
2 See Erel, Liao, and Weisback (2011) for an in-depth study on factors affecting the likelihood of a cross-border 
acquisition. 
3 Diversion for private benefits takes many different forms, from excessive perks and tunneling, to outright stealing of 
tangible and intangible corporate resources. 
4 Durnev and Kim (2005) show that firms with more profitable investment opportunities divert less for private benefits 
because more diversion leads to more rejection of positive NPV projects, reducing the value of controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights. In a similar vein, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and Doidge et al. (2009) show firms 
in weak-IP countries with better investment opportunities are more likely to bond themselves to fewer private benefits 
by cross-listing in a strong-IP country (the U.S. and the U.K.). 
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private benefits lower the control premium demanded by the controlling shareholder, making targets 
with greater profitable investment opportunities less costly to acquire.5  
According to this cost-based explanation, one cause of cherry picking is the gap in the 
strength of IP between the target and acquirer countries. If CGRs indeed strengthen IP, CGRs 
undertaken by emerging economies will reduce the IP gap, moderating the cherry picking tendency, 
whereas CGRs undertaken by acquirer countries with strong IP will enlarge the IP gap, intensifying 
cherry picking.  
To test this prediction, we examine cross-border acquisitions in 20 weak-IP target countries 
by acquirers from 13 strong-IP developed economies. Of the 33 sample acquirer and target countries, 
20 countries have enacted CGRs with substantive contents over 1998 – 2006. 6 If these CGRs 
strengthen IP, they will generate within-country variation in IP. As Table 1 shows, CGRs occurred in 
a staggered fashion, allowing for difference-in-differences tests to compare the type of firms targeted 
before and after a CGR between the treatment and control groups. 
Estimation results reveal a significant increase in cherry picking following CGRs by strong-
IP acquirer countries. Acquirers target firms about 15 percentiles higher in the pre-acquisition 
performance ranking among all firms in a country-industry-year combination after their home 
countries undertake CGRs. CGRs enacted by target countries, in contrast, weaken the cherry picking 
tendency. Foreign acquirers target firms about 13 percentiles lower in the pre-acquisition 
performance ranking after target countries undertake CGRs. 
Confounding effects around CGR years are a major concern for studies of this kind. We 
follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) and include a 
set of dummies corresponding to the periods before and after CGRs. The re-estimation shows our 
                                                 
5 This will not hold if an acquirer can buy 100% of a target’s outstanding shares while perfectly price-discriminating 
between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Such perfect price discrimination is not possible, because 
at the announcement of an acquisition bid by a foreign firm from a strong-IP country, the target’s share price will rise 
in anticipation of fewer private benefits and greater cash flows under the new ownership. This will prevent minority 
shareholders from selling shares at a lower price, making perfect price discrimination impossible. 
6 Five countries with CGRs do not enter the sample because of insufficient data on cross-border acquisitions and we do 
not count Brazil’s CGR as a CGR because it is too limited in scope and is considered ineffective by legal scholars. 
5 
 
results are not driven by confounding effects. Our results also are robust to changes over time in 
target countries’ openness toward foreign capital. We conduct a battery of robustness tests using 
alternative specifications and sample constructions. None alters our conclusion. 
Cherry picking distorts firm-level allocation of foreign capital inflows, limiting their access 
to poorly performing firms, which tend be capital constrained. Poorly performing firms can also use 
the managerial know-how that accompanies acquisitions by firms from advanced economies. Cherry 
picking also reduces a potential benefit of globalization – the spread of good corporate governance 
through foreign acquisitions of firms in emerging markets. If the foreign acquirers target only better 
performing firms, the improved governance system is unlikely to reach underperforming firms, 
which may be in greater need of improved governance.  
Our findings imply that improving legal investor protection in emerging economies will 
reduce these adverse effects by inducing foreign acquirers to reach out to underperforming firms. 
However, when capital exporting countries strengthen IP it seems to have the unintended 
consequence of pushing foreign acquirers further away from poorly performing firms. 
Related papers include Gelos and Wei (2005) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych 
(2008), who demonstrate a weak legal environment is one reason for insufficient capital flows from 
rich to poor countries (the “Lucas Paradox”). We extend their contribution by showing that the 
negative impact of a weak legal environment is concentrated on poorly performing firms. In a 
similar vein, Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) and Kim, Sung, and Wei (2011) document foreign 
investors avoid firms with ownership structures conducive to governance problems, e.g., those with 
a greater wedge between cash flow and control rights. These studies are based on a single investor 
country (the U.S.) and a target country (South Korea). In contrast, our sample covers 13 acquiring 
countries and 20 target countries, rendering our results more generalizable. 
The next section describes CGRs undertaken around the world over the period 1991-2007. 
Section 3 details empirical design, sample construction, and data used to estimate the impact of 
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CGRs on the cherry picking tendency. Section 4 presents the empirical results, along with robustness 
tests. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Corporate Governance Reforms (CGRs)  
We define CGRs as deliberate interventions in a country’s corporate governance tradition by 
the state, security and exchange commission, or stock exchanges. They are usually undertaken 
through publication of a set of codified corporate governance norms or amendments to countries’ 
corporate and/or securities laws pertaining to the role and composition of the board of directors and 
board committees; the appointment and rules of operation applying to external auditors; the 
distribution of rights and powers between management, shareholders, and other stakeholders; the 
role of media in information dispersion; and the protection of whistle blowers and penalty 
enhancement of corporate fraud (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Typical CGRs include the 
Australian CLERP 9, the Indian Clause 49, and the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
For each of the sample countries, we identify the most important CGR by searching 
websites of the European Corporate Governance Institute, the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) at the World Bank, the Financial Standards 
Foundation, and each country’s stock exchanges. We also read media news, law review and 
academic journal articles, and books about legislative activities intended to improve corporate 
governance and enhance financial transparency in the sample countries over the period of 1991 to 
2007. The objective of collecting information from so many different sources is to better understand 
the circumstances, contents, outcomes, and experts’ opinions of each legislative activity designed to 
enhance corporate governance systems. The search process involves obtaining background 
information on the corporate governance system of a country; key dates of relevant reforms; the 
scope of reforms; the level of enforcement; and the outcome, evaluation, and criticism of reforms. 
The basic identification criteria are as follows: 
i) The central objectives of a reform are to improve financial transparency, provide better monitoring 
by improving board structure and/or internal control systems, empower shareholders, and establish 
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effective legal systems. The contents of the reform should cover some of the following issues: 
enhancing disclosure requirements, strengthening governance mechanisms through specific 
requirements concerning the role and composition of the board of directors, empowering 
shareholders, and strengthening public enforcement. 
ii) The reform may have some exemptions but should be applied to all publicly listed firms in the 
country. Some regulations or new rules apply only to a subgroup of firms rather than all publicly 
listed firms in the country. For example in Finland, Handling of Corporate Governance Issues (2000) 
applies only to state-owned companies and their associated companies. Our definition of CGRs does 
not include these types of regulatory changes.  
iii) The level of enforcement of new rules must be either legal rules or comply-or-explain regulations, 
not purely voluntary compliance. When the new rules covered by a reform are subject to different 
levels of enforcement, the legislative action is defined as a CGR only if the majority of the issues 
covered by the reform are legal rules or comply-or-explain regulations. For example, the Danish 
Shareholders’ Association Guidelines of 2000 and the Berlin Institutive Code of 2000 are voluntary 
compliance recommendations that are not enforceable and, hence, are not considered CGRs. 
iv) The reform has received generally positive comments on its influence and effectiveness. Phrases, 
such as “milestone” or “the most important development of financial markets,” are used to infer that 
the new rules are relatively sound and effective. For example, Japan made regulatory changes in 
2002 to introduce a more “U.S.-style” governance system. We determine the new rules do not 
constitute a CGR because they are considered too weak to have meaningful impacts on Japanese 
corporate governance practices.  
v) Improving corporate governance may involve multiple regulatory regimes. When a country enacts 
multiple reforms, the most influential one is considered the CGR of the country. If the multiple 
reforms are more or less equivalent, the earliest one is considered the CGR of the country. In as 
much as each legal regime is part of a broader set of legal reforms geared toward an improved 
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corporate governance system, the earlier one signals implicit information about the future schedule 
of corporate governance improvement.  
These criteria sometimes require subjective judgments. To minimize the impact of 
subjectivity and prevent inconsistency, initially legislative activities indicating a CGR was coded 
independently by an author and a law school JD student research assistant (RA). For a few countries 
initial opinions differed on whether the country undertook a meaningful CGR; which activity should 
be identified as the CGR when there is more than one legislative activity to improve the corporate 
governance system; and which year should be considered as the CGR year for an identified reform. 
For each inconsistency, the author and the RA analyze the case until consensus is reached. After the 
initial coding, the author and a different RA (another law school JD student) re-code CGRs without 
referencing the prior coding. Again, when opinions differed, both the author and RA read the 
relevant documents and discuss to ensure consistency in the definition of CGRs across countries.   
Additionally, we verify the validity of the CGRs by conducting a broad survey of law 
review and academic articles and books to see whether existing corporate governance studies 
consider the CGRs we identified as important regulatory changes with positive impacts on corporate 
governance practices in the country. For example, Brazil made changes in its Corporate Law in 2001 
to improve minority shareholder rights and corporate transparency. However, the reform measures 
are considered to be very limited in scope and ineffective, receiving comments such as “…most of 
(Brazilian corporate reform) measures do not adequately promote better corporate governance 
practices, or strengthen capital markets” (Gorga, 2006, p.856) and “Board independence is an area of 
notable weakness … Financial disclosure lags behind world standards … Audit committees are 
uncommon” (Black, De Carvalho, and Gorga, 2009, p.424). We classify Brazil’s CGR as weak. 
Switzerland’s CGR is also classified as weak because the Swiss Code of Best Practice is only 
recommendations with no clear external enforcement mechanism. When we estimate the impact of 
CGRs on the cherry picking tendency in cross-border acquisitions, we treat the two countries as 
having no CGR.  
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The result is a lengthy document exceeding well over a hundred pages. It is available on the 
Journal’s website. The Appendix summarizes the key features associated with the CGR of each 
country identified to have undertaken a CGR during the sample period. For each CGR, it contains a 
brief summary of the key events involved, the CGR year, and the level of enforcement.  
 Table 1 lists countries with CGRs that meet our criteria, the CGR year(s), and the 
enforcement level. The year in parentheses is an alternative CGR year. 
3. Empirical Design and Data  
3.1. Specification 
We employ a difference-in-differences approach using corporate governance reforms (CGRs) 
undertaken by either acquirer or target countries. Acquirer and target countries are selected so that an 
acquirer country has stronger IP than the target country. Thus, if CGRs have their intended effects of 
strengthening IP, a CGR enacted by an acquirer country enlarges the IP gap, intensifying the cherry 
picking tendency, while a CGR by a target country narrows the gap, moderating the cherry picking 
tendency. We estimate the effects of the CGRs using a specification similar to the Gravity Equation 
model.  




























td + εijmnk   (1) 
Subscript i indexes target firms; j indexes industries of target firms; m indexes acquirer countries; n 
indexes target countries; k indexes acquirers; and t indexes years. The dependent variable, 
CDF(Y)ijmnkt, is the cumulative density function (CDF) of target i’s performance prior to the 
announcement of the acquisition bid. It measures the target’s relative performance (percentile) 
among all firms in a country-industry-year (n-j-t) combination. ACGRmt and TCGRnt are indicators 
equal to one if an acquirer- and a target country has undertaken a CGR by the year the acquisition 
bid for target i is announced, respectively; Xijmnkt is a vector of control variables; dj is target industry 
fixed effects; dm and dn are acquirer and target country fixed effects; dt is year fixed effects; and εijmnkt 
is the error term. To account for correlation among acquisition bids within an acquirer-target-country 
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pair, standard errors are clustered at the level of acquirer-target-country pair. Table 2 provides 
descriptions of all variables used in this study.  
This specification allows us to simultaneously control for target-, deal- and acquirer 
characteristics. The traditional acquisition target prediction models (e.g., Palepu, 1986) can control 
only for target characteristics, but not acquirer or deal characteristics that may be related to the type 
of firms being targeted.  
We use the CDF of a target’s performance because the cherry picking is about the 
performance of a target relative to the population of other potential target candidates in a country. 
CDF measures the performance of a target relative to all firms in a country-industry-year 
combination, enabling us to fully utilize large firm-level panel data on the population of potential 
targets. The CDF approach controls for the common time-varying factors affecting all target and 
non-target firms within the country-industry-year combination. With a raw performance measure as 
the dependent variable, the common time varying factors will not be controlled for, because the 
estimation would be based only on target firm observations. The CDF approach also controls for 
changes in targets’ pre-acquisition performance that may coincide with and/or are caused by the 
target country’s CGR. For example, CGRs may deflate accounting-based performance measures 
through stricter accounting standards. Furthermore, this ranking approach makes it unnecessary to 
compare the quality of performance information based on accounting data across countries and 
across years, an important concern in cross-country studies. It also reduces the importance of outliers 
by normalizing the variable into a unit interval.  
The variables of main interest are ACGR and TCGR. Their estimated coefficients measure 
the average effects of these CGRs on the cherry picking tendency. With the CDF approach, the 
estimated coefficients of CGR dummies provide intuitive economic interpretation: CGRs’ mean 
effects on target firms’ performance ranking among all firms in a country-industry-year combination 
prior to the announcement of an acquisition bid. The coefficient on ACGR is expected to be positive; 
an increase in the cherry picking tendency following an acquirer country’s CGR. The coefficient on 
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TCGR is expected to be negative; a decrease in the cherry picking tendency following a target 
country’s CGR.  
3.2. Sample construction 
  The sample for cross-border acquisitions is constructed at the level of acquisition bids. For 
sample inclusion, the bidder has to be from a strong-IP country; the target, from a weak-IP country. 
We remove noise arising from “round-tripping capital,”7 by defining company nationalities at their 
ultimate parent company level.  
3.2. a.   Acquirer and Target countries 
To classify countries into a strong-IP acquirer country and a weak-IP target country, we 
consider both the strength of legal institutions and the level of economic development. The strength 
of legal protection for minority shareholders is measured by an IP index constructed giving equal 
weights to de jure and de facto measures of legal protection.8 The de jure regulation is proxied by 
the anti-self-dealing index and the revised anti-director index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008). 
These indices measure different aspects of regulations concerning minority shareholder protection 
and receive equal weights in constructing the de jure regulation. Both indices are time invariant. The 
de facto regulation is measured by the law-and-order index provided by International Country Risk 
Guide, 9  which measures the strength and impartiality of a legal system and of the popular 
observance of the law. This measure is time varying, updated monthly. We use the yearly averages. 
There are 48 countries covered by both the Djankov et al. (2008) study and International Country 
Risk Guide. For each of these countries, we compute IP = (0.25*anti-self-dealing + 
0.25*nor_revised_anti-director + 0.5*law-and-order), where nor_revised_anti-director is the revised 
                                                 
7 “Round-tripping capital” means that capital originating from a country (usually a developing country) is routed to 
another country before re-entering the original country as foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows. In some developing 
countries (e.g., China), round-tripping capital is a popular phenomenon. Prasad and Wei (2008) estimate as much as 
one-third of Chinese FDI represents round-tripping capital. Round-tripping capital is often associated with tax evasion 
(Fisman and Wei, 2004). 




anti-director index divided by the highest value (5) of the index to make its scale the same as the 
other two indices. A higher IP value indicates stronger legal protection for minority shareholders. 
We separate the 48 countries into three groups by their relative ranking in the IP index. Then 
we supplement the IP-index-based ranking with indicators for the level of economic development, 
which are related to whether a country is a capital-importing or capital-exporting economy. The 
indicators are whether a country is considered an emerging market, as defined by the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International Emerging Markets Index, or a major economic power, as indicated by 
membership in the G7 group. We classify a country as a weak-IP target country if it belongs to the 
bottom third of the IP index or is an emerging market. If a non-emerging country belongs to the top 
third of the IP index or is a G7 country, it is classified as a strong-IP acquirer country.  No G7 
country falls into the weak-IP target country group, except Italy, a G7 country with an IP index in 
the bottom third. We classify Italy as a weak-IP target country, and later check the robustness by re-
estimating regressions while excluding acquisition bids for Italian firms. 
To sharpen the distinction, we drop the countries in the middle third that are neither an 
emerging market nor a G7 country. We also exclude countries with only one or two bids. These 
classification procedures yield 13 strong-IP acquirer countries and 20 weak-IP target countries. They 
are listed separately in Table 3, acquirer and target countries in Panels A and B, respectively.  
Table 3 also shows the breakdown in the number of bids made by each acquirer country’s 
firms for companies in each target country, pre- and post- CGR. Countries with no CGR have no 
observations for post-CGR periods. All acquirer countries, except Denmark and Japan, have CGRs, 
while only 8 out of 20 target countries have CGRs. The difference may be due to the Principles of 
Corporate Governance issued by the OECD in 1999 and 2004. The Principles have had more impact 
on OECD member countries than non-member countries, prompting more CGRs among the member 
countries, which tend to fall into the category of an acquirer rather than a target country.  
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For robustness, we construct an alternative grouping of weak- and strong-IP countries based 
only on the strength of legal institutions for investor protection and re-estimate the regressions. The 
results are robust.  
3.2. b.   Acquisition bids 
Because our objective is to study target selection, we do not distinguish between successful 
and unsuccessful acquisition bids. Some bids may be acceptable to a target’s controlling shareholder 
but fail because of government interventions or opposition by labor unions, among other reasons. 
Data on acquisition bids are taken from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. The sample of acquisition 
bids is constructed using the following criteria: 
i) Acquisition bids are announced between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2007. There were few 
cross-border acquisitions in emerging markets prior to the 1990s. Many emerging economies did not 
open domestic stock markets to foreign investors until the late 1980s (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; 
Henry, 2000; Kim and Singal, 2000).  
ii) Bidder and target firms are publicly listed with sufficient data to construct relevant variables to 
estimate the regression.  
iii) The bidder does not own any shares of the target prior to the announcement of the bid. This 
eliminates the influence pre-existing foreign ownership may have on target selection and on a 
target’s pre-acquisition bid performance and governance.  
iv) Bids are made for at least 10% of outstanding target shares. This cutoff point is used because the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ definition of FDI requires a minimum 10% stake. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) also use the 10% cutoff to define the block of shares conveying control rights. The sample 
mean (median) percentage shares sought by the bidders are 54.45% (57.34%). 
These screens yield 527 cross-border acquisition bids: 222 bids are announced after bidders’ 
home countries undertook CGRs; 198 bids are announced after target countries enacted CGRs.  
3.3. Firm performance variables 
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Two proxies are used to measure firm performance. The first is the growth rate of the ratio 
of sales to the book value of total assets, SALES/TA_Gr, one year prior to the announcement of bids. 
This proxy measures the growth rate in asset utilization. Faster growth in asset utilization to generate 
sales indicates better investment opportunities. We use the growth rate rather than the level because 
Yang (2008) shows that the changes in productivity affect decisions to buy or sell assets. In addition, 
Durnev and Kim (2005) and Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) provide evidence that sales 
growth rate is positively related to the quality of governance.  
We also use a level measure of firm performance: the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets, one year prior to the 
announcement of bids. This is a more standard measure of firm performance. We use this level 
measure to check the robustness of the results based on the asset utilization growth rates. 
To compute CDF of these two performance variables, we require at least 10 firms for each 
target firm’s country-industry-year matched sample, where industries are classified into 13 groups as 
in Campbell (1996). With this restriction, the mean (median) number of non-target firms for each 
target is 171 (104), suggesting that the CDFs provide reasonable measures of each target’s relative 
performance.10 CDF calculation requires large firm-level panel data on the population of potential 
targets. The main data sources are Compustat Global,11 Compustat North America, and Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum. Compustat Global provides financial data for firms listed outside the U.S. 
and Canada; and Compustat North America, for firms listed on U.S. or Canadian stock exchanges. 
These databases allow us to construct the performance and control variables. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics. The top two rows show target firms’ CDFs in the two 
performance measures.  The mean (median) CDF of target firms’ SALES/TA_Gr is 0.57 (0.57); the 
                                                 
10 The number of non-target firms is skewed and the mean is driven by big emerging target countries, such as China 
and India. The median is still large because we use the broad industry classification of Campbell (1996), which 
classifies industries into only 13 groups and because we require at least 10 firms for each target firm’s country-
industry-year matched sample.   
11 Compustat Global states that its data cover over 90 percent of the world’s market capitalization and are normalized to 




mean (median) CDF of target firms’ EBITDA/TA is 0.53 (0.55). These statistics suggest cherry 
picking; firms with above average (median) performance are targeted by acquirers from strong-IP 
countries. The remaining rows contain summary statistics of control variables described below. 
3.4. Control variables 
  We control for deal-, target-, bidder-, and country-level characteristics. Cross List is an 
indicator for target shares cross-listed on foreign stock exchanges at the time of a bid announcement. 
All cross-listings are in stronger-IP countries, reducing the effective gap in IP between targets and 
acquirers. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and (2009) show that firms cross-listed on U.S. and 
U.K. stock exchanges (strong-IP countries) have better investment opportunities and are subject to 
fewer private benefits. Thus, according to our model, foreign acquirers from strong-IP countries 
would be more attracted to the cross-listed firms. 
SOE is an indicator for targets that are state owned enterprises (SOEs). These acquisitions 
could be a part of an on-going privatization process in the target country. Privatization waves 
sometimes coincide with other regulatory changes such as a CGR. In addition, SOEs tend to be more 
politically connected and are governed differently from privately owned firms (Faccio, 2006).  
Friend and Tender are indicator variables for acquisition bids defined by SDC as “friendly” 
and bids made in the form of tender offers, respectively. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find more hostile 
takeovers take place in countries with greater shareholder protection, common law, and higher 
accounting standards. Of 527 acquisition bids in the sample, 329 are defined by SDC as friendly.12 
We control for tender offer bids because bidders can bypass target management’s resistance by 
making a public tender offer directly to shareholders. There are 37 tender offers in our sample. 
Diversified is an indicator equal to one, if the acquirer and target do not operate in the same 
industry as defined in Campbell (1996). Although it is doubtful an acquirer would go abroad for pure 
diversification purposes, the motivation may affect its target choice.  
                                                 
12 The rest are defined hostile(3), unsolicited (3),  neutral (123), and not applicable (69). 
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Target Total Assets and Acquirer Total Assets are the logged values of total assets of a 
target and an acquirer one year prior to the announcement of a bid. The size of the acquirer and the 
target may affect their relative bargaining power and the ability to create synergies.  
Acquirer EBITDA/TA is an acquirer’s EBITDA divided by its total assets one year prior to 
the announcement of a bid. Acquirers with higher EBITDA margins are likely to have more financial 
resources to acquire better performing firms, which tend to be valued higher and are more expensive 
to acquire. When acquirers have more profitable investments, their controlling shareholders are 
expected to consume fewer private benefits and value control premiums less. Thus, they may exhibit 
a greater tendency to cherry pick. 
Num of Bids is the total number of acquisition bids a target country received from our 
sample of acquirer countries in the year of acquisition bid. When target countries undertake CGRs, 
the improvement in legal environments may attract more foreign investment, resulting in more 
foreign acquisition bids and greater variation in the types of firms being targeted. Conversely, when 
acquirer countries undertake CGRs, acquirers may become more selective in weak-IP countries, 
reducing the number of possible targets. In addition, if a target country’s CGR coincides with 
financial liberalization policies concerning foreign acquisition of domestic firms, the number of bids 
may increase. Thus, Num of Bids may also help control confounding effects. 
Crisis is an indicator for financial crisis. Foreign acquirers may alter their acquisition 
strategies and frequencies in target countries during financial crises. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) 
find that the number of foreign M&As in East Asia increased by 88% between 1996 and 1998, a 
period when a number of countries in that region experienced financial crises. The indicator is equal 
to one, if the observation is in the following target country-year combinations: Mexico, 1994-95; 
Thailand, 1997-99; South Korea, 1997-99; Indonesia, 1997-99; Russia, 1998; Brazil, 1998-99; 
Turkey, 1994, and 2000-01; and Argentina, 2001-02. 
Finally, GDPPA Distance is the gap in GDP per capita between the acquirer and target 
countries one year prior to the announcement of a bid. The difference in economic conditions 
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between the acquirer and target countries may affect foreign acquirers’ bargaining power. For 
example, China invited foreign investments more aggressively in the 1990s than in the 2000s. 
(China’s gap in GDP per capita with the acquirer countries narrowed considerably during those 
periods.) The relative bargaining power may affect acquirers’ target selection. 
4. CGRs and Cherry Picking in Cross-border Acquisitions 
4.1. Main results 
The first set of regressions are estimated with control variables for deal-, target firm-, and 
target country-level characteristics, and with year-, target industry-, target country-, and acquirer 
country fixed effects. They do not control for acquirer characteristics to maximize the sample size. 
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 5 present the estimation results for CDF of target firms’ SALES/TA_Gr 
and EBITDA/TA, respectively. Both columns show positive and significant coefficients for ACGR 
and negative but insignificant coefficients for TCGR. The results indicate that CGRs undertaken by 
acquirer countries increase the cherry picking tendency.  
Columns (2) and (4) include acquirer- and acquirer country characteristics as additional 
control variables: Acquirer EBITDA/TA, Acquirer Total Assets, and GDPPA Distance. Adding these 
control variables reduces the sample size due to data unavailability. However, the negative 
coefficients of TCGR become significant in both columns (2) and (4). The TCGR coefficient in 
Column (2) implies that after a target country undertakes a CGR, firms targeted by foreign acquirers 
are about 13 percentiles lower in performance, a substantial decline in the cherry picking tendency. 
The estimated coefficient of ACGR continues to be positive at higher levels of significance. Column 
(2) indicates acquirers pursue targets about 15 percentiles higher in performance after their home 
countries undertake CGRs, a considerable increase in the cherry picking tendency.  
The evidence is similar when we use the targets’ EBITDA margin as the proxy for pre-
acquisition performance. Estimated coefficients in Column (4) suggest acquirers target firms 10 
percentiles lower in EBITDA margin after a target country undertakes a CGR; when an acquirer’s 
home countries’ undertake CGRs, it pursues targets 14 percentiles higher in performance.  
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Particularly noteworthy among the control variables is Acquirer EBITDA/TA, which is 
positively related to both CDFs of SALES/TA_Gr and EBITDA/TA at the one percent significance 
level. The positive coefficients imply more profitable acquirers cherry pick more. Better performing 
targets tend to be more expensive to acquire, and acquirers with greater EBITDA margins may have 
the necessary financial resources to acquire them.   
Acquirer EBITDA/TA also helps control non-legal factors captured in the TCGR dummy. An 
emerging country may not undertake a CGR until it reaches a certain level of economic development. 
For example, China undertook its CGR in 2001. By then it had enjoyed a double-digit average 
annual real economic growth rate since 1983. Thus, the TCGR dummy may pick up the effects of 
strong economic growth as well. 13 With strong economic growth, firms in target countries become 
more expensive, making them affordable only to cash rich acquirers, i.e., those with high 
EBITDA/TA. 
4.2 Confounding effects and other regulatory issues 
CGRs do not occur randomly. They are triggered by major scandals, economic growth, 
demand for foreign capital (e.g., India’s enactment of Clause 4914), pressures accompanying the 
1999 and 2004 publication of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, among others. Thus, 
changes in the type of firms being targeted following the CGR year may be caused by coincident 
economic or political events. To address this issue, we follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and 
Branstetter et al. (2006) and introduce a set of dummies corresponding to the years before and after a 
CGR. Because of the multi-collinearity problem, the confounding effects for ACGR and TCGR are 
tested in separate regressions.  
                                                 
13 Perhaps because of these non-legal factors captured in the TCGR dummy, the coefficients of ACGR are larger in 
magnitude and more significant than those of TCGR. Recent economic growth is an unlikely factor in the timing of 
CGRs by acquirer countries, already advanced economies growing at much slower rates than the target countries. The 
majority of acquirer countries’ CGRs are triggered by corporate scandals or highly publicized corporate events 
considered harmful to shareholders, which increases public demand to improve IP regulations. 
14 The desire to access global capital markets has been cited as a leading driver of the support for corporate governance 
reforms among Indian regulators and corporate leaders (Afsharipour, 2009). 
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The test results are presented in Table 6. When the confounding effects of ACGR (Columns 
(1) and (3)) are tested with the time dummies, target countries’ CGRs are controlled. Similarly, 
Columns (2) and (4) test the confounding effects of TCGR while controlling for acquirers’ CGRs. In 
constructing the time dummies, three or more years prior to the CGR year are used as the base years. 
Hence, the reform dummies start two years prior to the CGR year. ACGR_t-2 (ACGR_t-1) is equal to 
one if the acquisition announcement is made two (one) years before the acquirer country’s CGR year. 
ACGR_t is equal to one if the acquisition bid is announced during the year of CGR; and ACGR_t+1 
(ACGR_t+2) is equal to one if the announcement is made during the year (two or more years) after 
the CGR year. Time dummies for TCGR are constructed in the same way. 
Table 6 shows insignificant coefficients on dummies for all years prior to both target and 
acquirer countries’ CGRs, revealing no evidence of changes in the type of firms targeted prior to the 
reforms. All the coefficients on acquirer countries’ post-CGR year dummies in Columns (1) and (3) 
are positive, and four of six are significant. These results imply that CGRs enacted by acquirer 
countries have immediate and long term effects of exacerbating the cherry picking tendency. All the 
coefficients on target countries’ post-CGR year dummies in Columns (2) and (4) are negative, and 
two of six are significant, consistent with the earlier results indicating that CGRs enacted by target 
countries decrease the cherry picking tendency. The effects of target and acquirer countries’ CGRs 
on the cherry picking tendency are not driven by confounding effects surrounding CGR years. 
Our estimation may be affected by regulatory changes in the control group. For example, 
some countries introduce regulations improving corporate governance but their scopes and effects 
are not substantive enough to be classified as a CGR – e.g., Brazil in 2001 and Japan in 2002. If 
these regulatory actions have positive effects on IP, there will be less distinction between the control 
and treatment group, weakening the power of the test. Also, some countries with identified CGRs 
continue to issue new IP regulations after enacting CGRs, further refining the CGRs. The post-CGR 
observations enter our difference-in-differences test as a part of the control group; consequently, the 
post-CGR regulatory reforms narrow the estimated difference in the type of firms being targeted 
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between CGR and non-CGR countries, biasing the results against finding significant impacts of 
CGRs.  
4.3 Other robustness tests  
This section contains a battery of robustness checks. Re-estimation results are reported in 
Table 7 without control variables.  
Improving corporate governance standards through a CGR may coincide with new financial 
liberalization policies such as greater openness to foreign capital inflows. Controlling for Num of 
Bids partially addresses this concern. As an additional test, we include the ratio of target countries’ 
foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows to GDP, FDI Inflow/GDP. Because this variable is time-
variant, it will reflect changes in the openness toward foreign capital. Panel A of Table 7 shows 
negative coefficients on FDI Inflow/GDP, suggesting a decrease in the cherry picking tendency 
when a target country receives more foreign capital inflows. However, the effects of CGRs are 
robust; estimates of ACGR and TCGR are virtually unchanged from those in Table 5.  
Italy is an industrialized country belonging to the G7 group, but is defined as a weak-IP 
target country because it falls in the bottom third of the IP index. We re-estimate the regressions 
while excluding acquisition bids for Italian firms.  The results, reported in Panel B, are robust.  
Our categorization of strong-IP acquirer and weak-IP target countries takes into account 
whether a country is considered an emerging or a G7 economy. For robustness, we calculate a 
weighted average of the normalized Anti-self-dealing index and Law-and-Order index to construct 
an alternative IP index, IP_Alternative. A country is classified as a strong- or weak-IP country if it 
belongs above or below the median IP_Alternative. 15 Initially, we assigned an equal weight to both 
indices. However, this approach would rank countries such as China and Thailand ahead of France 
in terms of IP strength. Although France has civil law origination, ranking France behind China and 
Thailand in IP seems counter-intuitive. Thus, we experiment with different combinations of weights 
                                                 
15 In constructing this alternative index, we exclude the revised anti-director index. Pagano and Volpin (2005) point out 
the inadequacies of the original version of anti-director index in measuring minority shareholder protection, and 
Djankov et al. (2008) seem to have more faith in the anti-self dealing index than their revised anti-director index. 
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to come up with a reasonable ranking of countries in IP. The final choice is to give 20 – 80% 
weights to the Anti-self-dealing and Law-and-Order indices, at which point Italy and Spain are the 
only industrialized countries that are classified as weak-IP countries. This new categorization yields 
24 weak-IP target countries and 18 strong-IP acquirer countries. 16 The re-estimation results using 
this alternative IP index are reported in Panel C. The results are robust. As an additional robustness 
check, acquisition bids for firms in Italy and Spain are excluded from the sample. The results are 
similar (unreported).  
Four acquirer countries and four target countries have fewer than 10 acquisition bids. 
Regressions are re-estimated while excluding acquisition bids associated with these eight countries. 
The results, reported in Panel D, are robust.  
We conduct two more tests without reporting the results. Instead of clustering standard 
errors at the target-acquirer-country pair level, we cluster standard errors at the target and acquirer 
country level to allow for correlations among bids received within a same target country and among 
bids made by firms from a same acquirer country. We also re-estimate the baseline regressions with 
2001 as India’s CGR year. Both results are robust.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides a comprehensive documentation of major corporate governance reforms 
undertaken around the world over the period 1991-2007. We also demonstrate that the impacts these 
CGRs had on investor protection by providing evidence that they had significant effects on foreign 
acquirers’ cherry picking tendency when they choose targets in emerging economies.  
We argue when a foreign acquirer’s country has stronger IP than a target country, the 
acquirer’s controlling shareholder values private benefits of control less than controlling 
shareholders of local firms because stronger IP imposes greater constraints on diversion of corporate 
                                                 
16 The weak-IP countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungry, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The strong-IP countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  
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resources for private benefits. Within the target country, controlling shareholders of firms with more 
profitable investments take fewer private benefits and, hence, demand lower control premiums. 
Foreign acquirers, which value control premiums less, will target firms with more profitable 
investments. The tendency to cherry pick will intensify (moderate) as the IP gap between the 
acquirer and target countries increases (decreases). 
This prediction is tested with data on cross-border acquisition bids. Of 33 acquirer and target 
countries in our sample, 20 countries undertook CGRs. These CGRs, which took place in a staggered 
fashion, generate within-country variation in IP, allowing identification of the effect of changes in 
the IP gap between acquirer and target countries. Consistent with the prediction, we find a 
significant increase in the cherry picking tendency after strong-IP acquirer countries undertake 
CGRs. We also find CGRs undertaken by target countries reduce foreign acquirers’ tendency to 
cherry pick. These findings imply weak IP in target countries prevents poorly performing firms from 
gaining access to foreign investors, restricting the spread of the potential benefits of globalization. 
More generally, they highlight the importance of IP in guiding international capital flows not only 
across countries, but also across firms within a country.  
Recent studies demonstrate that cross-border acquisitions are an important channel to spread 
corporate governance systems from strong to weak legal regimes (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris 
and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010). This paper identifies a critical distortion in that 
channel. Cherry picking implies the transmission of governance systems through cross-border 
acquisitions occurs mainly for better performing firms, leaving largely untouched poorly performing 
firms, which may be in greater need of governance improvement. Improving the legal environments 





Appendix: Corporate Governance Reforms (CGRs) 
Argentina: In 2001 the government introduced a major reform to the regulatory framework 
applicable to the public offer regime. The reform incorporated the Corporate Governance Principles 
from the OECD, some of which were previously absent from the Argentine legal system. The 
Federal Executive Branch passed Decree 677/01, “Capital Markets Transparency and Best 
Practices,” also called the “Transparency Decree” or “TD.” It became effective on June 1, 2001. The 
year of CGR is defined as 2001, when the Corporate Governance Principles from the OECD became 
effective for Argentinean publicly listed firms. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Australia: The events at HIH and One.Tel prompted a series of significant corporate governance 
reforms in Australia that parallel post-Enron reforms in the U.S. and U.K. The most pivotal 
Australian legislative reform was the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & 
Corporate Disclosure) Act of 2004, CLERP 9. It contains important regulatory reforms to the audit 
function, disclosure, shareholder participation in governance, executive remuneration, and 
enforcement. Another key reform was the introduction of the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance for Australian listed companies, by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The year of 
CGR is defined as 2004 when CLERP 9 took effect and the ASX Principles also became fully 
effective. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain/Legal rule. 
 
Austria: The 2002 Austrian Code of Corporate Governance (Code) has been viewed as an effective 
tool for promoting confidence in the Austrian capital markets. The Code is based on the provisions 
of Austrian Corporation Law, Securities Law, and Capital Markets Law, as well as the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. It aims to strengthen investor confidence. It provides a 
framework for corporate management and control. The year of CGR in Austria is defined as 2004 
when The Vienna Stock Exchange began enforcing the Code on a comply-or-explain basis. 
However, because the Code was met with many declarations of adherence prior to 2004, the year of 
publication (2002) can be used as an alternate year of CGR. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-
explain. 
 
Belgium: Committee Lippens published a new Belgian Code on Corporate Governance on 
December 9, 2004. The Code replaces the 1998 Recommendations on Corporate Governance, which 
was voluntary. The Code entered into force on January 1, 2005, the deadline for all Belgian listed 
companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with international 
accounting standards (IAS). The year of CGR in Belgium is defined 2005 when the new Belgian 
Code on Corporate Governance took effect and IAS is adopted by all Belgian listed companies. 
Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain/Legal rule. 
 
Brazil: The new Corporation Law (10.303/2001) was enacted on October 31, 2001. It became 
effective 120 days after promulgation. The 2001 reform strengthened minority shareholders rights 
and improved standards for disclosure, with improved laws on tag-along rights, de-listing, non-
voting shares, election of board members by minority shareholders and private arbitration. The year 
of CGR in Brazil is defined as 2002, because the new Corporation Law No. 10303 became fully 
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effective and is the only enforced reform initiative in Brazil. The reform is limited in scope and is 
considered ineffective. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. This CGR is considered weak. 
 
Canada: In 2004, Canadian corporate law and securities regulation was supplemented by a series of 
new national and multilateral securities instruments. They set new standards for independent audit 
committees, certification requirements for corporate officers, and disclosure standards. The 
cumulative effect of the regulatory shifts is that public issuers in Canada will be held to more 
rigorous standards in the transparency of their governance structures and practices and in the 
requirement of independence in management supervision. The year of CGR in Canada is defined as 
2004 when the reforms on disclosure, audit committees, and accountability were adopted 
nationwide. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Chile: The Securities Market Law (SML) and the Corporation Law (CL) form the legal framework 
governing listed companies in Chile. In December 2000, both laws were overhauled by Law No. 
19,705, also known as the Tender Offers and Corporate Governance Law or Ley de OPA. Law 
19,705 is an ambitious and innovative piece of regulation, directed to improve fairness, 
transparency, and order in the Chilean capital market as a whole. The year of CGR is defined as 
2001 because it is the first full year when Law No. 19,705 began to influence market participant’s 
behavior. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
China: In an effort to raise Chinese corporate governance standards in line with international best 
practices, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission issued a new Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies in January 2001 
(Code). It was effective from the date of issuance. The Code strictly follows the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. The year of the CGR is defined as 2001 when the Code was enacted and 
international standards were enforced on listed Chinese firms. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Finland: In July, 2004, the Corporate Governance Recommendation for Listed Companies (Code) 
entered into force to harmonize existing regulations, increase operational transparency, and improve 
the quality of disclosure. The Code includes key issues on general shareholder meetings; supervisory 
boards; board committees; managing directors; other management; compensation; internal controls; 
risk management and internal audits; insider administration; external audits; and communication and 
disclosure. The year of the CGR is defined as 2004 when the Code entered into force on a comply-
or-explain basis. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
France: Two laws were passed to strengthen the legal position on corporate governance: the May 
2001 Law on New Economic Regulations (NRE), and the August 2003 Financial Security Law 
(LSF). These laws specifically target transparency and ethics within companies. The year of the 
CGR is defined as 2003 when LSF took effect. While the NRE began to influence corporate 
governance behavior, we believe that the regime change was not complete until the LSF law, the 
French version of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, made significant changes to French corporate 




Germany: In September, 2001, the German Federal Minister of Justice established a governmental 
commission, which published the initial version of the German Corporate Governance Code (Code) 
in February, 2002. The key sections of the Code include shareholders and the general meeting; 
management board; supervisory board; transparency; and reporting and auditing annual financial 
statements. It is viewed as the German version of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Code entered 
into force on July 26, 2002. The year of the CGR is defined as 2002 when a declaration of 
conformity with the new German Corporate Governance Code was required by passage of the 
Transparency and Disclosure Law. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
Hong Kong: On January 30, 2004, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited published 
“Exposure of Draft Code (Code) on Corporate Governance Practices and Corporate Governance 
Report (The Exposure Paper).” The Exposure Paper was benchmarked against the best prevailing 
market practices and international standards of corporate governance, and follows a comply-or-
explain principle. The Code became effective January 1, 2005. The year of the CGR is defined as 
2005 when the HKEX began enforcing The Exposure Paper. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-
explain. 
 
India: Clause 49 took effect in phases over 2000 through 2003. It contained both requirements and 
recommendations on the minimum percentage of independent directors, board meetings, codes of 
conduct, limits on directorships simultaneously held, the power of the audit committee, certification 
by the CEO and CFO of financials. Firms failing to meet these requirements can be de-listed and 
given financial penalties. On March 31, 2001, the original Clause 49 went into effect for all 
companies in the Bombay Stock Exchange 200 and all newly listed companies after that date. 
Compliance requirements were extended to March 31, 2002 to cover all listed medium and large 
companies. The year of CGR is defined as 2002. The year of 2001 is also used for a robustness 
check. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Italy: In response to corporate scandals and CGRs in other countries, the government enacted Law 
262 (The Savings Law) in December 2005. It is considered the Italian equivalent of the U.S. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Savings Law introduces amendments to the Financial Law Consolidated 
Act on the appointment and requirements of directors, the composition and powers of the board of 
statutory auditors, and other controlling bodies for monistic and dualistic models. Additionally, a 
new Corporate Governance Code (Code) was promulgated by the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa 
Italiana) in March 2006 to strengthen corporate governance among listed companies. The new Code 
has a comply-or-explain basis, replacing the Preda Code, which was voluntary. The year of the CGR 
is defined as 2006 when the Savings Law became effective and the new Code began to effect listed 
companies. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Malaysia: The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Code) was published in March 2000. It 
took effect through revamped exchange listing requirements on January 22, 2001. The Code sets out 
principles and best practices of structures and processes that companies may use to achieve an 
optimal governance framework. It focuses on four areas: board of directors; director’s remuneration; 
shareholders and accountability; and audit. The year of the CGR is defined as 2001 when the Listing 




Mexico: The 1975 Securities Market Law (LMV) was substantially amended in 2001. Specific 
measures encompassed in the LMV reforms include: granting the National Banking and Securities 
Commission the power to regulate tender offers in order to prevent the exclusion of minority 
shareholders from the benefits of these transactions; restrictions on the issuance of non-common 
shares; prohibition of issuance of “stapled shares” unless the non-voting shares are convertible into 
common shares within five years; requirements for independent members on boards of directors, 
appointment of board members by minority shareholders, and the establishment of audit committees; 
stricter enforcement, with certain violations punishable as criminal offences; and changing the 
regulatory approach from a merit-based approach to a disclosure regime. Reforms to the LMV took 
effect in June 2001. The year of the CGR is defined as 2001. Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Netherlands: Following several scandals and having acquired a reputation for weak investor 
protection, the Netherlands released a second corporate governance code in 2003. The Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code (Code) was an initiative of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs. Its scope was wider and aimed at legislative changes. The Code has 5 sections: 
compliance with and enforcement of the code; the management board, the supervisory board, the 
shareholders and general meeting of shareholders; the audit of the financial reporting; and the 
position of the internal auditor function and of the external auditor. The Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code was published on December 9, 2003. It became effective on January 1, 2004. 
The year of the CGR in the Netherlands is defined as 2004 when the Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code became effective. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
Norway: The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (Code) is based on a 
provisional national code. The Code was published in December, 2004, and became effective 
starting with fiscal year 2005. The Code adds new principles to strengthen shareholders’ confidence 
in listed companies and consists of a large number of separate recommendations concerning the 
protection of minority shareholders; board independence; internal control; company leadership; and 
relationships with the public, external investors, and creditors. Adherence to the Code is based on a 
comply-or-explain principle. The year of the CGR is defined as 2005. Level of enforcement: 
Comply-or-explain. 
 
Poland: After a series of corporate governance scandals increased awareness of the importance of 
minority shareholder rights, several organizations developed corporate governance codes, including 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The Warsaw Code has been accepted by the Polish Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the WSE, and the Polish Confederation of Private Employers. The WSE 
delivered Best Practices in Public Companies (Code) in 2002. The WSE requires listed companies to 
disclose compliance with the Code on a comply-or-explain basis. Market participants report that the 
Code appears to have had a significant impact on company behavior. The year of the CGR is defined 
as 2002 when the WSE imposed the Code on listed companies. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-
explain. 
 
Singapore: In 2003, a Code of Corporate Governance (Code) entered into force with the 
recommendation of the Corporate Governance Committee, formed by the Ministry of Finance and 
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Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). The Code is implemented through the Singapore 
Exchange Listing Rules, and the MAS ensures that the Code is up-to-date with international 
practices. The Code is divided into four main sections: board matters, remuneration matters, 
accountability and audit, and communication with shareholders. For annual general meetings held 
from January 1, 2003 onwards, listed companies are required to describe in annual reports their 
governance practices with specific reference to the principles of the Code, as well as disclose and 
explain any deviation from any Guidance Notes of the Code. The year of the CGR is defined as 2003 
when the Code was enforced for listed companies. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
South Korea: After Korean corporate governance was cited by the IMF as one of the major causes 
of the 1997 financial crisis, several rounds of amendments to the Commercial Code and the 
Securities Exchange Act took place between 1998 and 2000. The major amendments require all 
firms listed on the KSE have at least 25% outside director board composition, establish various 
minority shareholder rights, introduce cumulative voting, require an audit committee, and improve 
accounting principles to enhance financial transparency. The year of the CGR is defined as 1999 
when the package of new laws and regulations effecting corporate governance began to take effect. 
Level of enforcement: Legal rule. 
 
Spain: The year of the CGR in Spain is defined as 2006 when the Unified Code was published and 
companies began to evaluate their disclosure statements using internationally recognized best 
practices as a baseline in preparation for their 2007 annual reports. Although the earlier 
Transparency Law is generally regarded as a significant reform in Spain’s corporate governance, the 
2006 reforms address broader internationally recognized categories of corporate governance reform. 
The 2006 Corporate Governance Unified Code has been called the strictest Spanish code to date, 
which has intensified pressure on companies once again to improve their corporate governance 
practices. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
Sweden: Two major scandals in 2002 and 2003 triggered two regulatory initiatives. First, the 
government completed a revision of the Companies Act of 1975, which ended in a new Companies 
Act in May 2005 (with effective implementation in January 2006). In 2002 the government also 
supported the creation of a Commission on Business Confidence mandated to draft a national code 
on corporate governance for listed companies (Code). The Code, enacted as a supplement to the 
Companies Act, aims to improve the governance of Swedish companies, primarily to ensure that 
companies are run in the best interests of the owners. 2006 was the first full year when the Code is 
applied and departures from Code rules must be reported and explained. The year of the CGR is 
defined as 2006, which is the first time the bundled reform was enforced simultaneously. Level of 
enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
Switzerland: The introduction of the two new sets of corporate governance rules in 2002 marked a 
milestone in the development of corporate governance system in Switzerland. The Directive on 
Information relating to Corporate Governance, issued by the Swiss Exchange (SWX), came into 
force on July 1, 2002 and aimed to enhance corporate transparency. Additionally, in 2002 the Swiss 
Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance was issued by Economiesuisse. The year of the 
CGR in Switzerland is defined as 2002 when the Corporate Governance Directive took effect. The 
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Swiss Code of Best Practice is not included as part of a bundle because it is only recommendations 
with no external enforcement mechanism. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. This CGR is 
considered weak. 
 
UK: The current system of corporate governance in the UK can be traced to widely publicized 
corporate scandals in the late-1980s and early 1990s. In 1991, the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance was established, which issued a series of recommendations 
contained in the Cadbury Report. The report laid out recommendations on the separation of the role 
of the chief executive and chairman, balanced composition of the board, selection processes for non-
executive directors, transparency of financial reporting, and stronger internal controls. In 1995, 
concerns about directors' pay and share options led to another set of recommendations comprised in 
a report called the Greenbury Report. The Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were merged to form the 
Combined Code in 1998, which applied to all listed companies with comply-or-explain enforcement. 
The year of the CGR is defined as 1998. Level of enforcement: Comply-or-explain. 
 
US: The Enron and other major scandals in the early 2000s led to the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX), which greatly enhanced financial transparency and brought about significant changes in the 
U.S. corporate governance system. It is widely considered to be the most important U.S. corporate 
governance reform since the 1930s, as corporate governance rules had previously been imposed by 
the stock exchanges and respective state laws. The Act strengthened rules on board independence 
and the role of audit committees, tightened reporting and disclosure requirements, mandated 
certification of financial statements by the CEO and CFO, and established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, with a mission to oversee audits of public companies and related 
matters. The year of the CGR is defined as 2003 when most of the provisions of the SOX and the 
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Table 1: Countries with Corporate Governance Reforms (CGR), Year of CGR, and Level of 
Enforcement. 
 
This table contains a list of countries that have undertaken a CGR during the sample period, the CGR year, 
and the level of enforcement. The year in parentheses is an alternative CGR year. To be considered as a 
CGR, the level of enforcement for the majority of new rules must be legal rules or comply-or-explain 
regulations, not purely voluntary. The Appendix contains a brief summary of each CGR. More detailed 
descriptions of background information, key dates, scope, the level of enforcement, outcome and criticism, 
and regulations for each CGR are provided on the Journal’s website. 
 
Country CGR Year Level of Enforcement  
Argentina  2001 Legal Rule 
Australia 2004 Comply-or-Explain / Legal Rule 
Austria 2004 (2002) Comply-or-Explain  
Belgium 2005 Comply-or-Explain / Legal Rule 
Brazil 2002 Legal Rule (Weak) 
Canada 2004 Legal Rule 
Chile 2001 Legal Rule 
China 2001 Legal Rule 
Finland 2004 Comply-or-Explain 
France 2003 Legal Rule 
Germany 2002 Comply-or-Explain 
Hong Kong 2005 Comply-or-Explain 
India 2002 (2001) Legal Rule 
Italy 2006 Legal Rule 
Malaysia 2001 Comply-or-Explain 
Mexico 2001 Legal Rule 
Netherlands 2004 Comply-or-Explain  
Norway 2005 Comply-or-Explain 
Poland 2002 Comply-or-Explain 
Singapore 2003 Comply-or-Explain 
South Korea 1999 Legal Rule 
Spain 2006 Comply-or-Explain  
Sweden 2006 Comply-or-Explain 
Switzerland 2002 Comply-or-Explain (Weak) 
United Kingdom 1998 Comply-or-Explain 








Table 2: Descriptions of Corporate Governance Reform (CGR) Variables, Firm and 
Deal-specific Variables, and Country-level Variables. 
 Panel A: Corporate Governance Reform (CGR)Variables 
ACGR An indicator equal to one if an acquirer country has undertaken a CGR.  
TCGR An indicator equal to one if a target country has undertaken a CGR. 




Target firms’ growth rate of the ratio of sales to the book value of total assets (asset utilization 
rate) one year prior to the announcement of an acquisition bid. (Source: SDC, Compustat Global, 




The ratio of earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to the book value of 
total assets one year prior to the announcement of an acquisition bid. (Source: SDC, Compustat 
Global, and Compustat North America) 
Cross List 
 
An indicator equal to one if a target firm’s shares are listed on foreign stock exchanges. (Source: 
SDC and Compustat Global and Compustat North America) 
SOE An indicator equal to one if the ultimate parent of a target firm is the government. (Source: SDC) 
Diversified 
 
An indicator equal to one if an acquirer and the target are not in the same industry as defined by 





An acquirer’s earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by 
the book value of total assets one year prior to the announcement of an acquisition bid. (Source: 
SDC, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America) 
Friend An indicator equal to one if an acquisition bid is defined as a friendly acquisition. (Source: SDC) 




The natural logarithm of an acquirer’s book value of total assets one year prior to the 
announcement of the acquisition bid. The book value of assets is denominated in 2000 US$. 
(Source: SDC, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America) 
Target Total 
Assets 
The natural logarithm of a target’s book value of total assets one year prior to the announcement 
of the acquisition bid. The book value of assets is denominated in 2000 US$. (Source: SDC, 
Compustat Global, and Compustat North America) 







0.25*anti-self-dealing + 0.25*nor_revised_Anti-director + 0.5*law-and-order. Anti-self-dealing 
measures minority shareholder protection against controlling shareholders’ self-dealing. It is a 
time invariant country level measure, ranging from zero to one. (Source: Djankov, et al., 2008) 
Revised anti-director index is the aggregate index of shareholder rights. Nor_revised_anti-director 
is the normalized value of revised anti-director index by the maximum value of revised anti-
director index among all countries. It is a time invariant country level measure, ranging from zero 
to one. (Source: Djankov et al., 2008) Law-and-order measures the strength and impartiality of a 
legal system and of the popular observance of the law. It changes every year, ranging from zero to 
one. (Source: International Country Risk Guide). A higher IP score indicates stronger investor 
protection. 
IP_Alternative 0.2*anti-self-dealing + 0.8*law-and-order. Anti-self-dealing and law-and-order are defined above. 
Num of Bids 
 
The total number of acquisition bids a target country received from foreign acquirers of our 





The difference in GDP per capita between the acquirer and target countries one year prior to the 
announcement of acquisition bid. All values in GDPPA are converted into 2000 US$ in thousands. 
(Source: World Development Indicators for all countries except Taiwan; MarketLine-Research 
Database for Taiwan) 
FDI 
Inflows/GDP 
The ratio of net inflows of foreign direct investments to GDP. (Source: World Development 
Indicators for all countries except Taiwan; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for Taiwan) 
Crisis 
 
An indicator equal to one if the acquisition bid is announced in the following country-year 
combination: Thailand, 1997-99; South Korea, 1997-99; Indonesia, 1997-99; Brazil, 1998-99; 








Table 3: Number of Acquisition Bids by Firms in Acquirer Countries for Companies 
in Target Countries.  
 
Panel A, Column (1) provides a list of acquirer countries in the sample. Column (2) shows the total 
number of acquisition bids made by firms in each acquirer country with data available to construct 
CDF(Sales/TA_Gr) or CDF(EBITDA/TA). CDF is a cumulative distribution function and the 
variables are defined in Table 2. Columns (4) and (6) show the number of acquisition bids made by 
firms in each acquirer country before and after the acquirer country undertakes a corporate 
governance reform (CGR), respectively. Columns (3), (5), and (7) show the percentage of bids 
made by firms in each acquirer country relative to the total number of bids made during the full-, 
pre-CGR-, and post-CGR period, respectively. In Panel B, Column (1) provides a list of target 
countries in the sample. Column (2) shows the total number of acquisition bids made for firms 
located in each target country with data available to construct CDF(Sales/TA_Gr) or 
CDF(EBITDA/TA). Columns (4) and (6) show the number of acquisition bids made for firms in 
each target country before and after the target country undertakes a CGR, respectively. Columns 
(3), (5), and (7) show the percentage of bids made for firms in each target country relative to the 
total number of bids made during the full-, pre-CGR-, and post-CGR period, respectively. The 
CGRs are summarized in Table 1 and the Appendix.   
 
Panel A: Number of Acquisition Bids by Acquirer Country 
Acquirer 
Country Full %  
Pre-
ACGR %  
Post-
ACGR %  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Australia 20 3.80 17 5.57 3 1.35 
Canada 13 2.47 7 2.30 6 2.70 
Denmark 7 1.33 7 2.30 0 0.00 
Finland 6 1.14 2 0.66 4 1.80 
France 10 1.90 3 0.98 7 3.15 
Germany 49 9.30 28 9.18 21 9.46 
Hong Kong 42 7.97 32 10.49 10 4.50 
Japan 56 10.63 56 18.36 0 0.00 
Norway 3 0.57 1 0.33 2 0.90 
Singapore 38 7.21 23 7.54 15 6.76 
Sweden 9 1.71 7 2.30 2 0.90 
United Kingdom 63 11.95 5 1.64 58 26.13 
United States 211 40.04 117 38.36 94 42.34 








Table 3: Number of Acquisition Bids by Firms in Acquirer Countries for Companies in 
Target Countries (Continued). 
 
Panel B: Number of Acquisition Bids for Firms in Target Country 
Target 
Country Full %  
Pre-
TCGR %  
Post-
TCGR %  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Argentina 3 0.57 3 0.91 0 0.00 
Brazil 28 5.31 28 8.51 0 0.00 
Chile 11 2.09 8 2.43 3 1.52 
China 61 11.57 14 4.26 47 23.74 
Czech 
Republic 13 2.47 13 3.95 0 0.00 
Greece 8 1.52 8 2.43 0 0.00 
India 58 11.01 15 4.56 43 21.72 
Indonesia 21 3.98 21 6.38 0 0.00 
Italy 32 6.07 25 7.60 7 3.54 
Malaysia 59 11.20 27 8.21 32 16.16 
Mexico 19 3.61 15 4.56 4 2.02 
Peru 4 0.76 4 1.22 0 0.00 
Philippines 19 3.61 19 5.78 0 0.00 
Poland 11 2.09 6 1.82 5 2.53 
Russia 12 2.28 12 3.65 0 0.00 
South Africa 35 6.64 35 10.64 0 0.00 
South Korea 65 12.33 8 2.43 57 28.79 
Taiwan 37 7.02 37 11.25 0 0.00 
Thailand 26 4.93 26 7.90 0 0.00 
Turkey 5 0.95 5 1.52 0 0.00 








Table 4: Summary Statistics for Key Variables. 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the paper. All variables are described in 
Table 2. 
 
 Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDF(SALES/TA_Gr) 464 0.565 0.571 0.300 0.009 1.000 
CDF(EBITDA/TA) 492 0.533 0.546 0.283 0.019 1.000 
Cross List 527 0.085 0.000 0.280 0.000 1.000 
SOE 527 0.082 0.000 0.274 0.000 1.000 
Num of Bids 527 6.829 6.000 4.141 1.000 16.000 
Diversified 527 0.311 0.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
GDPPA Distance 527 23.115 22.960 8.174 2.421 40.059 
Acquirer EBITDA/TA 486 0.042 0.093 1.018 -22.000 0.804 
Friend 527 0.624 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Tender 527 0.070 0.000 0.256 0.000 1.000 
Acquirer Total Assets 486 9.015 9.255 2.773 -7.006 14.554 
Target Total Assets 527 5.977 5.857 2.159 -1.486 12.223 
FDI Inflows/GDP 527 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.030 0.120 







Table 5: Impacts of Corporate Governance Reforms (CGRs) on the Type of Firms Targeted by Foreign 
Acquirers. 
 
This table reports the baseline estimation results of the impact of CGRs undertaken by either acquirer or target 
country on the type of firms targeted by foreign acquirers. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the 
numerical cumulative density function (CDF) of the growth rate of asset utilization rate of the target firm 
(CDF(SALES/TA_Gr)). In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the CDF of EBITDA margin, 
EBITDA divided by the book value of total assets of the target firm (CDF(EBITDA/TA)). All variables are 
defined in Table 2. All regressions are estimated with year-, target industry- (defined as in the Campbell (1996) 
industry groupings), target country-, and acquirer country fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
are corrected by clustering observations at the acquirer-target country pair level. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  CDF(SALES/TA_Gr) CDF(EBITDA/TA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TCGR -0.061 -0.134** -0.068 -0.099* 
  (0.062) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) 
ACGR 0.132* 0.153** 0.092* 0.140*** 
  (0.072) (0.065) (0.049) (0.048) 
CrossList -0.104* -0.074 0.067 0.048 
  (0.053) (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) 
SOE 0.069 0.099 0.062 0.085 
  (0.064) (0.091) (0.059) (0.063) 
Target Total Assets 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Num of Bids 0.005 0.008 0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Crisis 0.064 0.107 -0.124 -0.091 
  (0.110) (0.119) (0.081) (0.083) 
Diversify -0.003 0.010 -0.097*** -0.085** 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) 
Tender -0.062 -0.068 0.026 0.028 
  (0.047) (0.053) (0.045) (0.052) 
Friend 0.010 -0.007 0.008 0.012 
  (0.032) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) 
GDPPA Distance   -0.004   0.004 
    (0.005)   (0.004) 
Acquirer Total Assets   -0.001   -0.007 
    (0.006)   (0.006) 
Acquirer EBITDA/TA   0.022***   0.037*** 
    (0.006)   (0.008) 
Constant 1.078*** 0.544* 0.071 -0.158 
  (0.215) (0.276) (0.212) (0.257) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Target Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Target Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Acquirer Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 464 426 492 450 




Table 6: Impact of Confounding Effects on the Type of Firms Targeted. 
This table reports the test results on the impact of confounding effects on the type of firms targeted. The dependent variable is the numerical 
cumulative density function (CDF) of SALES/TA_Gr in Columns (1)-(2) and the CDF of EBITDA divided by the book value of total assets in 
Columns (3)-(4). ACGR_t-2 (ACGR_t-1) is equal to one if the acquisition announcement is made two (one) years before the acquirer country’s 
CGR year. ACGR_t is equal to one if the acquisition bid is announced during the year of CGR; and ACGR_t+1 (ACGR_t+2) if the announcement 
is made during the year (two or more years) after the CGR year. Time dummies for TCGR are constructed in the same way. All variables are 
defined in Table 2. All regressions are estimated with year, target industry (defined as in Campbell (1996) industry groupings), target country, and 
acquirer country fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected by clustering observations at the acquirer-target country pair 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  CDF(SALES/TA_Gr) CDF(EBITDA/TA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TCGR -0.130**   -0.102*   
  (0.063)   (0.054)   
ACGR_t-2 0.079   -0.082   
  (0.083)   (0.069)   
ACGR_t-1 -0.045   0.082   
  (0.106)   (0.080)   
ACGR_t 0.103   0.223***   
  (0.081)   (0.076)   
ACGR_t+1 0.101   0.155**   
  (0.082)   (0.071)   
ACGR_t+2 0.201**   0.123*   
  (0.080)   (0.067)   
ACGR   0.170***   0.138*** 
    (0.063)   (0.048) 
TCGR_t-2   0.043   0.060 
    (0.125)   (0.101) 
TCGR_t-1   0.113   0.029 
    (0.117)   (0.101) 
TCGR_t   -0.069   -0.079 
    (0.112)   (0.075) 
TCGR_t+1   -0.080   -0.205** 
    (0.107)   (0.097) 
TCGR_t+2   -0.188*   -0.026 
    (0.099)   (0.081) 
CrossList -0.074 -0.064 0.046 0.043 
  (0.062) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) 
SOE 0.088 0.103 0.093 0.080 
  (0.092) (0.090) (0.066) (0.063) 
Target Total Assets 0.014 0.012 0.000 0.002 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Num of Bids 0.007 0.009 0.022*** 0.025*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Crisis 0.107 0.049 -0.087 -0.113 
  (0.121) (0.111) (0.081) (0.097) 
Diversify 0.008 0.003 -0.085** -0.079** 
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) 
Tender -0.077 -0.072 0.039 0.026 
  (0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.051) 
Friend -0.008 -0.007 0.014 0.016 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) 
GDPPA Distance -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Acquirer Total Assets -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Acquirer EBITDA/TA 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Constant 0.554** 0.558* -0.141 -0.111 
  (0.277) (0.286) (0.233) (0.274) 
Year-, Target Industry-, Target-  and 
Acquirer Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 426 426 450 450 







Table 7: Alternative Model Specifications and Sample Constructions. 
 
This table reports results of robustness tests for the results in Table 5 to alternative model specifications 
and sample constructions. All regressions include the same control variables used in Columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 5 but not reported. The definitions of all variables are given in Table 2. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are corrected by clustering at the acquirer-target country pair level. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
    CDF(SALES/TA_Gr) CDF(EBITDA/TA) 
    (1) (2) 
Panel A: 
Controlling for 
changes in the 




FDI net inflows 
as a percentage of 
GDP 
TCGR -0.132** -0.098* 
  (0.059) (0.055) 
ACGR 0.146** 0.137*** 
  (0.064) (0.048) 
FDI Inflows/GDP -2.720** -1.784 
  (1.181) (1.221) 
Year-, Target Industry-, 
Target-  and Acquirer 
Country FE Y Y 
Observations 426 450 







TCGR -0.131** -0.104* 
  (0.063) (0.058) 
ACGR 0.146** 0.146*** 
  (0.065) (0.047) 
Year-, Target Industry-, 
Target-  and Acquirer 
Country FE Y Y 
Observations 405 428 




strong- IP  
acquirer countries 
and weak IP 
target countries 
based on the 
median value of 
IP_Alternative 
TCGR -0.129** -0.025 
  (0.050) (0.050) 
ACGR 0.134*** 0.095** 
  (0.050) (0.039) 
Year-, Target Industry-, 
Target-  and Acquirer 
Country FE Y Y 
Observations 523 550 






fewer than 10 
acquisition bids 
TCGR -0.150** -0.090 
  (0.061) (0.059) 
ACGR 0.151** 0.134*** 
  (0.068) (0.049) 
Year-, Target Industry-, 
Target-  and Acquirer 
Country FE Y Y 
Observations 388 410 
Adj-R2 0.09 0.18 
 
